Syria’s weapon and munition landscape post-Assad

Fenix Insight has documented 2,819 incidents involving munitions, weapons, platforms, and chemical/radiological threats since the fall of the Assad regime. These include: clashes between the caretaker government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa and former regime loyalists; rising tensions with the Druze community; recoveries, captures and handovers of weapons to authorities; increased civilian accidents from unexploded ordnance; and ongoing Israeli military operations.

Munitions handed over, recovered or confiscated under Syria’s new government

The new government has focused on disarmament efforts to consolidate control over existing weaponry scattered across Syria. This campaign encourages former regime troops, members of armed groups, and civilians to voluntarily surrender weapons and munitions to authorities. Simultaneously, security forces have recovered or confiscated weapons and munitions through intelligence-led operations and community tip-offs.

Fenix Insight has captured and analysed: 17 instances of weapons and munitions being voluntarily handed over; 31 being recovered or found; and 73 instances being seized by the authorities.

Some of the munitions that were seized were being smuggled across borders, predominantly Lebanon, but also Iraq and Jordan. Particular munitions captured, such as one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs), thermobaric weapons, and guided missiles are noteworthy due to the risks they pose. For instance, man-portable aerial defence systems (MANPADS) pose a threat to civilian and military air travel. Various anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), including some of the most capable available, have also been captured. Munitions containing a thermobaric fill are often controversial, given they produce a high-temperature enhanced blast effect in comparison to conventional high explosive fills. While these interdictions curb proliferation, some shipments likely evade detection.

The ongoing risk posed to civilians by Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Abandoned Ordnance (AXO)

Since the fall of the Assad regime on the 8th of December 2024, civilians have been returning to their villages and towns. According to the UNHCR, 600,000 people are expected to return home in the next six months. They are returning to areas where they are likely to encounter significant threat from UXO and AXO. A number of these munitions may not be immediately recognisable, either due to their improvised nature, or because damage and ageing have significantly altered their appearance. The number of casualties related to encounters with explosive hazards since December 8th has increased significantly, and is expected to continue to increase as more people return to their homes and agricultural lands. Clearance operations continue in an effort to support local populations return to their land.

Risk of weapons and munitions proliferation across the region and beyond

Abandoned regime bases left unsecured during the HTS offensive held large stockpiles that were vulnerable to looting and smuggling, prior to coming under new government control. Additionally, Israeli airstrikes on military sites have further destabilised these stockpiles, leaving remaining hardware in uncertain, often unsafe conditions, with the few security measures preventing entry to these installations most likely destroyed.

The proliferation of weapons and munitions across the region and beyond poses a critical risk, driven by Syria’s vast and diverse stockpiles. The new government’s limited control and economic hardship are likely to escalate smuggling, looting, and scrap recovery. Combined with widespread non-state actor activity, this creates regional and global risks, including spill-over to conflict zones like Africa.