Risks posed by Explosive Remnants of War in Gaza and the associated clearance challenges

On the 17th of November 2025, the UN Security Council voted in favour of a US-drafted resolution endorsing President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan for Gaza. The resolution calls for the creation of an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) to both demilitarise and govern Gaza. Although the framework promises large-scale reconstruction and a path toward Palestinian self-determination, uncertainty surrounds its design, implementation and acceptance on the ground. Clearance of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) left after more than two years of conflict is crucial to enable the safe delivery of humanitarian aid, the return of internally displaced people (IDPs) and reconstruction efforts.

Given the intensity of the conflict, significant amounts of ERW, ordnance which has failed to function (unexploded ordnance [UXO]) or is left behind by combatants (abandoned ordnance [AXO]), are present throughout Gaza in varying conditions. Additionally, the large variety of munitions present within the conflict zone will complicate clearance further.

ERW range in size from large air-dropped bombs which failed to detonate on impact, to small grenades and small-arms ammunition that have been left behind. Some ERW may be visible in plain sight, while others remain hidden under rubble or buried underground. A number of these munitions may not be immediately recognisable, either due to their improvised nature or because damage and ageing have significantly altered their appearance.

Air-dropped bombs in an urban environment

When munitions are used within an urban environment there is a greater potential for grazing of targets, where the munition does not adequately impact in order to function. Examples include air-dropped bombs that contact buildings on their descent, altering their trajectory and slowing their descent sufficiently to stop detonation when impacting the ground, this leads to them becoming UXO in an armed and unsafe state.

Many bombs are likely to be deep-buried, with excavation bringing both structural and explosive hazards. Previous conflicts have shown that locating and extracting all deep-buried bombs is rarely possible, with construction often resuming in the knowledge that unexploded bombs remain beneath. However, the long-term residual risks depend on a highly complex set of factors (fuzing, damage, explosive type, soil conditions and water content etc) and are still not well understood.

Due to their size and the quantity of explosive content they hold, these unexploded bombs (often seen lying on the ground in social media posts, but many of which are hidden among and beneath the rubble) pose a real threat if moved incorrectly. Furthermore, the high-explosive fills from some of these unexploded bombs have been scavenged for use with other munitions, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mines and projectiles. This creates additional uncertainty as the state of the UXO is further altered.

Unexploded bomb types found in Gaza

Modification of conventional munitions

The modification of conventional munitions, such as grenades, for drone delivery, will also complicate clearance. Fuzing mechanisms, which typically have safety features built in, are often modified for use with drone-dropped munitions. While it is often possible to identify the base munitions, it may be unclear whether any modification has taken place, or what that might be, creating additional uncertainty and increasing risk.

Mines

Mines pose a significant threat to clearance personnel and civilians in many current or previous conflict zones, as they are often buried or concealed, and may remain capable of functioning after years in the ground. Hamas made extensive use of locally-manufactured anti-personnel (AP) and anti-tank (AT) mines over the recent conflict. A variety of locally-manufactured and conventional AT mines are fielded, including the Shawaz and Thaqib series’; Italian TC/6 (or Egyptian T.C.6) and; US M15.

Various locally-manufactured and conventional AT mines that may be found in Gaza

The Al-Qaffaza is an AP bounding mine with a reported kill radius of 30-100 m. It is victim-operated, and has been seen placed under tunnel entrance or in shallow holes. The ‘thunder charge’ and tv-shaped devices are both anti-personnel directional fragmentation (APDF) mines that can be command-initiated or victim-operated, with tripwires and improvised detonation trains. Their effective range is between 20-120 m, depending on the variant. Imagery has shown them being located within built-up environments, or within tunnels, where they are aimed down tunnel lengths or at key intersections.

Al-Qaffaza	Thunder Charge	TV-shaped devices
			Examples of locally-manufactured and conventional AT mines that may be found in Gaza

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

Due to their improvised nature, often manufactured from common objects, IEDs are difficult to both identify and safely clear. The Sejil is an IED that reportedly incorporates explosive scavenged from Israeli munitions. The outer casing is likely a former oil or paint drum to blend with surroundings, further complicating identification.

A commonly used IED is the Elbow; this has no consistent design however, it typically consists of a steel, right angled elbow (hence the name) pipe connector, which is filled with gunpowder or other pyrotechnic powder. Similar ‘pipe bombs’, still possibly referred to as Elbow, but using straight cylindrical steel tube sections, are also present. Their unobtrusive design allows them to blend easily with surroundings, where they may be mistaken for a safe piece of debris.

Elbow	Sejil
		Two types of IED manufactured and found in Gaza

Variations within designs

The Hamas Al-yassin 105 anti-armour and anti-structure rocket assisted projectile are amongst the most widely used munitions in Gaza, with large numbers still likely to be present as either unexploded or abandoned ordnance. The anti-armour projectile is a copy of the Soviet/Russian PG-7VR, however the anti-structure round features a thermobaric main warhead in place of the original anti-armour, complicating identification and disposal.

Al-Yassin 105 anti-armour	Al-Yassin 105 anti-structure
		Examples of the most widely used munitions in Gaza, with large numbers still likely to be present

The Al-Yassin has been further modified to become the Commando Action Package, an IED that is magnetically-affixed, placed on a surface, or thrown into an open hatch of armoured vehicles.

Israeli munitions can also incorporate design variations, which are not always apparent from their external appearance. One example is the Mikholit guided glide bomb (unpowered missile), which is intended for deployment by drone, and can incorporate different warheads. The warhead options create uncertainty in disposal methods, one being a purely shaped charge warhead, whereas another two are combined effects (shaped charge and preformed fragmentation) designs.

Design variations, which are not always apparent from their external appearance.

Newer developments from this year

In the last nine months of the conflict there were further developments from both Hamas and Israel. Hamas introduced the Barq, a variant of the Shawaz designed to be more portable and smaller for targeting of vehicles through open hatches. Whereas Israel began using large one-way attack drones, like the SkyStriker, or FPV drones, more commonly against various targets.

Barq	SkyStriker	FPV drone
			2025 munition and delivery developments

The variety of munitions present

While many of the other conventional munitions present may be known, the sheer scale and variety of them means that clearance personnel are unlikely to be familiar with all of them. Fenix Insight have been tracking this through METIS continuously, with dozens of Israeli and Hamas munitions being identified as present in Gaza, outside of those already covered in this report. These include:

• Bombs (e.g. GBU-31, GBU-32, GBU-38, GBU-39, Lizard 4 etc.)

• Rockets (e.g. Haseb-1, Type 63-2, PG-29V, Rajum, Grad.10km etc.)

• Mortar bombs (e.g. 60 mm M61, 81 mm M91, 120 mm M48 etc.)

• Projectiles (e.g. M329, Tandem 85, M485, PG-7VM, F-7, TBG-7 etc.)

• Missiles (e.g. 9M133-1, I-Raad-T, AGM-114, Red Arrow, 9M32, 9M32M etc.)

• Grenades (e.g. M26A2, 7290M, Barq, F-1, GS59 etc.)

• Drones (e.g. Al-Zouari, Ababil-2, Ababil-2T etc.)

The examples above are a small subset of those known to have been deployed in Gaza by Israel, Hamas, and other militant groups.

The importance of awareness for both civilians and clearance personnel

From a purely technical point of view, the combination of a dense urban environment, extensive damage to structures, deep-buried bombs and the variety of munitions used in the conflict, will pose a great challenge to future clearance efforts. It is difficult to quantify the levels of UXO and AXO within Gaza, however significant resources and expertise will be required to reduce the risk to clearance personnel and civilians.

In most post-conflict situations, clearance efforts are led by NGOs and civilian contractors, but neither are likely to have the resources and knowledge to address the range of ERW challenges within Gaza on their own. In particular, technical information, such as details of warhead design and fuzing, is unlikely to be handed over by any of the munition suppliers. Likewise, the large volume of locally-manufactured, modified and fully improvised explosive ordnance will create great uncertainty.

While the challenge is great, it can be surmounted through awareness and understanding of the threats posed. Explosive ordnance hazard awareness will likely form a critical part of this, for civilians and clearance personnel alike. Likewise, proper planning and application of appropriate resources will be essential to ensure a safe and efficient clearance of Gaza, to support peace building and reconstruction efforts.